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Two experiments examined how individuals respond to a restriction presented within an
approach versus an avoidance frame. In Study 1, working on a problem-solving task,
participants were initially free to choose their strategy, but for a second task were told
to change their strategy. The message to change was embedded in either an approach
or avoidance frame. When confronted with an avoidance compared to an approach
frame, the participants’ reactance toward the request was greater and, in turn, led to
impaired performance. The role of reactance as a response to threat to freedom was
explicitly examined in Study 2, in which participants evaluated a potential change in
policy affecting their program of study herein explicitly varying whether a restriction was
present or absent and whether the message was embedded in an approach versus
avoidance frame. When communicated with an avoidance frame and as a restriction,
participants showed the highest resistance in terms of reactance, message agreement
and evaluation of the communicator. The difference in agreement with the change was
mediated by reactance only when a restriction was present. Overall, avoidance goal
frames were associated with more resistance to change on different levels of experience
(reactance, performance, and person perception). Reactance mediated the effect of
goal frame on other outcomes only when a restriction was present.
Keywords: freedom restriction, goal frames, avoidance, approach, reactance, self threat, change
INTRODUCTION
The antagonism between the inevitability of change and resistance to change is deeply ingrained
in human thinking and acting. A general aversion to change has been attributed to a fundamental
motivation to favor previously made choices and to attach ourselves to courses of action, once they
are initiated (Cialdini et al., 1995). In everyday life, we often encounter demands for change of
our behavior, e.g., adapting the syllabus of a research methods course to follow new department
guidelines. The motivation and likelihood with which we are going to implement the requested
change to our syllabus depends upon the degree to which we perceive such a demand as a threat
to our freedom. Our inclination to make the change may also be influenced by whether the
demand has been communicated as aimed at achieving better learning outcomes or avoiding
negative learning outcomes. Does communication style additionally influence the perceived threat
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 632
fpsyg-07-00632 May 13, 2016 Time: 15:0 # 2
Niesta Kayser et al. Avoidance Goal Frames and Reactance
to freedom in the request? And if so, are there requests that
are more restricting than others? The present experiments were
designed to examine whether and how communication style
framed with approach and avoidance goals affects the impact of
freedom restrictions.
Change and Psychological Reactance
Within the field of social psychology the concept of freedom is
mostly looked at in the context of the individual’s control and
choice. Reactance theory (Brehm and Brehm, 1981) in particular
emphasizes the importance of individual freedom and behavioral
choices and defines conditions under which people react against
attempts to control their behavior and eliminate their freedom
of choice. Freedom in terms of reactance theory is defined as
a person’s belief to be able to engage in a certain behavior and
to decide on the type of behavior, as well as how the behavior
is performed and when. Thus, reactance theory proposes that
when we believe to be free to choose a course of action, we
experience reactance if that freedom is eliminated or threatened.
According to Brehm (1966), psychological reactance is an
aversive motivational state directed toward the re-establishment
of freedom, even if that resistance is not associated with optimal
outcomes for the person. The potentially negative consequences
of reactance are mirrored in the fact that the term is adapted from
the field of electrical engineering and means ‘blind resistance.’
Reactance manifests itself in an increased desire to engage in the
restricted behavior or actual attempts to engage in it, or an active
refusal to engage in the prescribed behavior, e.g., students may
decrease their own effort, patients may not adhere to treatment
plans, or employees may resist the implementation of a new
strategy. When Amy asks her friend Rachel to accompany her
to the concert of their favorite band and uses the message “you
must come with me,” reactance is likely aroused by forcing a
desired outcome on the person; likewise, reactance is aroused as
well by eliminating access to a desired outcome such as when
parents forbid their daughter to attend the concert: “you must
not go to this concert” (Wicklund, 1974). Where freedom is
threatened by social pressure, reactance evokes the tendency to
reassert the lost freedom by the individual to resist that pressure,
e.g., by reducing one owns efforts to slow down the proposed
goal or by disagreeing with the communicator to weaken the
implementation of a project (e.g., Dillard and Shen, 2005; Silvia,
2006). Reactance occurs in response to a message that implies a
forceful attitude and makes the person want to approach a desired
goal, which will lead the person to resist this imposition or the
way the request is imposed upon them. Likewise, reactance occurs
when the message contains a perceived threat and prohibits
a specific behavior or demands the person to stay away from
a desired goal. This will likely lead the person to resist this
prohibition or the way the prohibition is phrased.
In its origin, reactance theory examined how people can be
persuaded, attitudes can be changed, and consumer behavior can
be influenced. The theory extends to other aspects of individual
behavior that involve motivation following uncontrollable events,
in particular, achievement motivation and task performance. In
contrast to Seligman’s (1975) theory of learned helplessness,
which predicts a decrease in subsequent motivation and
performance a loss of control over outcomes is experienced,
whether or not it is aversive, reactance theory predicts increased
motivation and performance. In order to accommodate these
seemingly opposing predictions, Wortman and Brehm (1975),
proposed an integrative model: When perceived control over
an outcome is high, psychological reactance results in enhanced
motivation to achieve and perform well when having to overcome
resistance. However, when participants’ expectation of control
is low, subsequent performance should deteriorate when facing
resistance. In line with this model and based on the work by
Folkman and Lazarus (1985), experienced stress induced for
example by particular demands of a task, can be evaluated as
challenging or threatening. Perceptions of challenge enhance
performance, whereas perceptions of threat inhibit performance.
Moreover, introducing change in the rules of the task at hand
has shown to have a negative effect on participants’ performance.
In a study by Drach-Zahavy and Erez (2002), threat was
operationalized in terms of negative outcomes and an interview
with the five worst performers, a procedure that set a focus on
failure (as opposed to the challenge condition, where the focus
was set on success). This procedure deemed to be particularly
detrimental in a change situation in which the participants had
to use a different strategy at round 2 compared to round 1.
Particularly owing to the work on stereotype threat, the link
between existence of a threat and depletion of self and lowered
performance (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Steele and Aronson, 1995;
Frederickson et al., 1998) is well documented. Similarly, a threat
induced by a demand to change should consume resources, divide
attention away from the task, and therefore disrupt and diminish
an individual’s mental activity. A change request in the academic
context, we argue, can be experienced as a threat, and if it is, it
should impair intellectual performance.
Reflected in the current literature on social influence, requests
to change are especially pertinent to questions of persuasive
communication. It might represent a threat to Rachel, when Amy
communicates the message that they ‘must’ visit a concert of a
band that they both like, even if Rachel is a fan of this band
herself. In fact, one of the basic claims of reactance theory is that
high-pressure communicators are likely to be seen as threatening
to personal freedom (Wicklund, 1974; Brehm and Brehm, 1981).
In a study requesting the change for the use of washing detergents
from containing phosphates to not containing phosphate, one
indication of consumers’ reluctance to participate in this change
of habit was expressed in their beliefs that washing detergents
without phosphate would be less efficient (Mazis et al., 1973).
Research examining the role of state-(Rains and Turner,
2007) trait-(Pavey and Sparks, 2009) reactance in how persuasive
information on health risks is evaluated and affects intentions
to engage in health behaviors has shown a negative relationship
between reactance and the intended effect of such messages. Here
reactance has also been associated with a perception of threatened
freedom, further supporting the original theory in the domain of
persuasion.
Derogating the object is one possible avenue to restore
freedom, while derogating the source of threat (Kohn and Barnes,
1977) is another possible outcome of reactance albeit indirectly.
This is consistent with the initial theoretical reasoning by Brehm
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(1966) arguing that reactance could not be measured directly,
but instead be inferred by its effects. Since the beginning of the
work on reactance, reactance has been implicitly and explicitly
defined in many different ways. Among other accounts, reactance
has been viewed as cognitive (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1986),
i.e., measurable through thoughts that can be listed in self-
report techniques and operationalized in terms of counter-
arguing. Since reactance evokes anger and is associated with the
experience of hostile feelings (Wicklund, 1974), it has also been
considered an emotion (e.g., Dillard and Mejenders, 2002).
Finally, whether the motivation to restore freedom following
an uncontrollable event is set in the domain of achievement
or persuasion, reactance as a motivated psychological state will
likely guide attention, influence thought process (Derryberry and
Tucker, 1994), stimulate feelings, and direct behavior (Kuhl,
1986). Change induced in an aversive manner may therefore
be reflected in reactance shown in cognitive, affective, and
behavioral outcomes.
Change and Goal Framing
Change implies a new direction and new goals that can imply
the elimination of options and the reduction of a set of perceived
freedoms. A restricted freedom may yield greater aversion when
pursued with a certain type of goal. Avoidance goal frames
focus on trying to avoid or stay away from a negative outcome
or a negative psychological situation. Examples of avoidance
goal frames are “Try to avoid doing poorly on a test,” “Try
not to be disloyal to friend,” and “Try to avoid smoking a
cigarette.” Approach goals, on the other hand, use positive,
desired possibilities such as “Try to do well on a test,” “Try to be
a loyal friend,” and “Try to become smoke-free,” which typically
leads to favorable psychological processes and outcomes, such as
perceptions of personal progresses or competence in goal pursuit
(Elliot and Sheldon, 1997; Elliot et al., 1997). The approach-
avoidance distinction is integral to the understanding of how
individuals deal with changes, as requests to change always also
imply a change in motivational tendency to initiate a shift in a
person’s course of action. The type of goal that is pursued in light
of a restriction leads to a number of important implications for
the experience of threat.
Goal Framing and Reactance
Looking at goal framing and how it relates to a person’s sense of
freedom and threat to freedom, the experience of the different
goal frames in terms of reactance should vary according to the
respective goal frame: Approach goal frames suggest a change
in course of action that can be a potential gain to the status
quo, i.e., no change in course of action will lead to a neutral
outcome, whereas a change leads to a positive outcome, and
therefore change can be interpreted as optional. In this vein, a
sense of behavioral freedom is maintained and approach goal
frames associated with a restricted freedom should therefore yield
less psychological reactance.
Avoidance goal frames, on the other hand, suggest a change in
course of action that is required in order to avoid experiencing
a deterioration of the status quo, i.e., no change in course
of action will lead to a negative outcome, and therefore the
change is not optional. Therefore setting an avoidance goal
frame when told to change has the potential to increase the
perception of restriction to behavioral freedom. A change
embedded in an avoidance goal frame might thus be associated
with more psychological reactance than when embedded in
an approach goal frame. Moreover, the inherent focus on
negative possibilities in avoidance goal frames has shown to
be associated with a host of aversive psychological processes,
including perceptual, attentional, mental control, emotional and
behavioral processes, for example experiencing fear of failure,
anxiety, and wanting to escape from the goal-relevant situation
(for example, Wegner, 1994; Elliot and McGregor, 1999). This
link between avoidance goal frames and aversive psychological
processes can be interpreted as a threat to a central self-motive
(Graupmann et al., 2013), which may result, among others in a
tendency to react against the implied restriction of freedom.
Research has yet to directly examine the link between
the restriction of a freedom, avoidance goal pursuit and
the emergence of reactance. If freedom was threatened by
implication, the emergence of reactance when avoidance but
not approach goal frames are salient would suggest that this
type of goal framing is experienced as a self-threat. Along
with this idea, research on the self posits that self-regulation
draws on a limited common pool of resources (Baumeister,
1998). Since regulating the self is difficult, subsequent acts
of self-regulation entail a state of ego-depletion (Baumeister,
1998). An individual that engages in goal-directed behavior
and that monitors his/her goal progress expends resources.
Furthermore, research on goal pursuit documents that the
pursuit of some types of goals is more depleting than others
(Oertig et al., 2013). In particular, avoidance compared with
approach goal frames have been shown to deplete self-regulatory
resources, which is manifested in perceptual, attentional,
emotional, and behavioral deficits. This grounding in negative
possibilities may produce aversive psychological processes that
have negative consequences such as resistance, impairment of
performance, and disagreement with social influence; processes
much as experienced following a perceived elimination of
freedom.
According to this goal-pursuit-reactance approach to self-
threat, an avoidance frame in a restricting situation should
not only be detrimental to the willingness to comply with
the request, but also be more self-impairing than an approach
frame: avoidance goal frames have been repeatedly found to
lead to a less deep processing of tasks, to preparing things in
a more disorganized fashion, to worrying more about the own
competence and to elicit more negative emotional reactions
(Elliot and McGregor, 1999).
People are generally motivated to approach positive outcomes
and avoid negative outcomes. However, to the best of our
knowledge, only limited research has been conducted on the
interplay of the impact of goal framing on performance and
perception processes when a freedom is restricted. Integrating
predictions from reactance theory and approach avoidance
accounts into a larger theoretical framework enables us to test the
impact of an avoidance goal frame when a person is told to change
and, more importantly, through the experience of reactance of
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this person and her subsequent task performance and person
perception processes.
Combining these two lines, perceptions of and requests to
change are a threat due to (1) the potential to restrict one’s
freedom as predicted by reactance theory and (2) the threatening
nature when the change is framed in terms of avoidance goals.
Overview of the Present Research
In the present research, we investigate the link between goal
framing and psychological reactance as an indication of threat to
self. On the basis of both theory and prior empirical work on goals
and resistance to change, we hypothesize that change requests
presented with an avoidance goal frame will be associated with
(a) worse performance and (b) more negative evaluations of
competence (own and communicator’s) than change requests
presented with approach goal frames. We further hypothesize
that change requests presented with an avoidance (as compared
with approach) goal frame will be associated with (c) more
experience of reactance and in turn negatively affect the outcome.
We have conducted two studies designed to test this set of
hypotheses. In Study 1, a change request implied a restriction by
asking participants to switch from a preferred working strategy
to a new one that they previously did not chose and the goal
frame was varied between approach and avoidance. In Study 2,
we systematically varied the presence of a freedom restriction, as
well as the goal frame in a message given to student participants
about a proposed change in their study program. In both studies
all procedures were in accordance with the local IRB regulations
and the Declaration of Helsinki.
STUDY 1
A goal is a cognitive representation of a possible state or outcome
that an individual seeks to attain (Austin and Vancouver, 1996;
Elliot and Thrash, 2002) and goals focus on either a positive
or a negative possibility. Given that the way in which a goal is
worded corresponds to the way in which the goal is represented
in memory (Elliot and Friedman, 2007), we systematically varied
the frame of the goal in which the change request was phrased.
Method
We conceptualized a change request presented as a restriction
framed with an approach goal as something that the participants
“must do” versus a restriction framed with an avoidance goal as
something that the participants “must not do.”
With the goal of 50 participants, we began collecting data
from a college student sample during the spring semester and
terminated data collection when the academic year ended leaving
a final N = 56.
Participants and Design
Fifty-six (39 women) undergraduates at the University of
Rochester participated in the experiment entitled “Applied
performance and problem solving” in return for course credit.
The mean age of participants was 20.00 years (range = 18–24).
Three participants who failed to engage in the puzzle-solving
task were excluded from the analyses. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two between-subjects goal frame conditions:
the approach goal frame condition (n= 29) or the avoidance goal
frame condition (n = 24). The approach goal frame condition
was manipulated by the wording “For the following task, you
must choose a different strategy than the one that you just used”
in half of the cases. The avoidance goal frame condition was
manipulated by the wording “For the following task, you must
not choose the same strategy that you just used” in the other half.
The experimenters in this and the subsequent experiment were
blind to participants’ condition, and remained unaware of the
hypotheses being tested throughout data collection.
Procedure
Upon arrival for the experiment, participants were greeted and
presented with a computer-based problem-solving task on a
screen (adopted from Förster et al., 1998, Study 3; anagram test).
The screen displayed a collection of the letters d, p, q, b, r, and
g presented in a rectangular box with rows and columns filled
with letters where each letter was presented exactly 114 times1.
The participants received the written instruction that completing
the task consisted of counting how many times the letter p was
presented on the screen and that they were under no time limit.
Following the presentation of the letters with an open time
frame, participants were free to choose one among four possible
strategies to complete the initial task for practice purposes: One
strategy involved searching letters row by row, a second one
involved searching letters column by column, a third involved
searching letters grid by grid and the fourth involved searching
the screen as a whole. After these strategies were explained to
participants, they selected the strategy that suited them the most.
They completed the task again with no time limit which consisted
in counting how many times the letter p was presented and in
entering the correct number in a field on the bottom of the screen
online. After the participants finished solving the initial task,
they were told to complete a second problem-solving task (very
similar to the first task), hereby inducing the change. The change
consisted in the explicit instruction to use a different search
strategy than the one they had just adopted for the initial task,
hereby manipulating the respective goal frame condition. This
constituted the second round of solving the puzzle. The second
task used the letters v, k, w, x, y, and z (to avoid habituation);
participants were asked to search for the letter v (again same
amount of letters for each letter category).
After completing the tasks, the participants were administered
the measures and then given a final questionnaire assessing their
basic demographics. Finally, participants were debriefed about
the purpose of solving the puzzle and informed that the session
was now over.
Measures
Accuracy of solving the puzzle
A difference measure of how many letters were correctly
identified in each of the two rounds was calculated to represent
1An image of each puzzle option is displayed in the section for Supplementary
Materials.
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the overall accuracy of solving the puzzle and the performance of
the participants. Similar to previous studies in which the absolute
difference scores were computed (see Drach-Zahavy and Erez,
2002: high difference scores represented low performance), we
took the absolute number of correctly identified letters at round 1
and subtracted it from the absolute number of correctly identified
letters at round 2. If the resulting number was positive, the
participants correctly identified more letters at round 1 compared
with round 2. Conversely, if the participants identified more
letters at round 2 compared with round 1, the resulting number
was negative. In this manner, we were able to determine the
accuracy of solving the puzzle and the performance accounting
for the change from round 1 to round 2. Hence, not the
performance per se at time 2, but the difference between the
two rounds contingent on the respective goal frame condition
was measured. Unlike previous research, we did not assess stress
appraisals of challenge as opposed to threat, but manipulated the
threat by restricting the strategy that the participants could select
for the second task.
Reactance
Experience of threat to freedom in the form of psychological
reactance was assessed with nine items used in previous research
(Jonas et al., 2009). Items include “How reasonable did the
request to change the strategy appear to you?” and “How
restricted did you feel in your freedom to choose the strategy
you wanted to use”? (1 = not at all, 10 = extremely) Scores were
averaged to form a composite index (α= 0.83).
Additional measures
Two one-item measures for perceived task difficulty (“How
difficult do you think the task was”) and perceived competence
(“How competent do you think you were in solving the puzzle”;
1 = not at all, 10 = extremely) were adapted from existing




A one-sample t-test on mean performance of participants
between the two rounds showed that performance did not
improve in general between round 1 (M = 7.90, SD = 6.49)
and round 2 (M = 7.05, SD = 7.49), t(52) < 0.50, p > 0.64).
Additionally, an independent sample t-test on performance
in round 1 showed that it was similar in both goal framing
conditions (Diff = −2.99, SD = 1.82), t(51) = −1.64, p = 0.11.
Next, we tested whether performance differed as a function
of condition and option selected by the participants at round
2. There were no significant main effects nor interaction, all
Fs < 1.62, all ps > 0.199.
According to our hypothesis, a change request in an avoidance
frame corresponds to an increase in perceived freedom restriction
(i.e., a threat) which translates into increased reactance which,
in turn impairs performance. We tested this mediational
hypothesis using the bootstrapping procedure and corresponding
SPSS macro process of Hayes (2012) developed for mediation
and moderation analysis. It allowed us to test for indirect
effects, regressing performance onto goal frame (dummy-coded:
approach = 0/avoidance = 1), with reactance as the proposed
mediator. One thousand bootstrap resamples were performed. As
expected, we found an overall effect for goal frame and reactance
on performance, R2adj. = 0.11, F(2,50) = 3.18, p = 0.048.
First, a direct effect of goal frame on performance shows that
those who were asked with an avoidance frame (compared to
an approach frame) to switch their strategy found 4.79 more
letters at round 1 compared with round 2, t(51) = −2.07,
p = 0.036, 1 − β = 0.708, with a 95% confidence interval
excluding zero (0.146–9.441), hence doing worse than those
asked with an approach framed goal. Moreover, those who
were asked with an avoidance frame were 0.93 relatively more
reactant, t(51) = 2.51, p = 0.015, 1 – β = 0.669, with a
95% confidence interval excluding zero (0.185–1.675) than those
asked with an approach frame, a score resulting from the
difference in reactance following a one-unit change in goal frame.
Additionally, those who felt relatively more reactant found on
average 1.68 less letters at round 2, t(51) = −2.04, p = 0.047,
1 − β = 0.712, with a 95% confidence interval excluding
zero (−3.337 to −0.028). Most importantly, the indirect effect
of goal frame on performance through reactance is negative
and statistically different from zero as evidenced by a 95%
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval that is entirely
below zero (−4.11 to −0.19). Suggesting that those participants
confronted with an avoidance framed change request performed
1.57 times worse on average than those confronted with an
approach framed change request, as a result of the mediation by
reactance (see Figure 1, for a graphical depiction of the mediation
model).
Reactance and Additional Dependent Variables
First, we tested the impact of goal framing on reactance,
task difficulty, and self-perceived competence to compare the
differential effect of approach and avoidance goal framing.
Avoidance as compared with approach frame increased
reactance, t(51) = −2.51, p = 0.015, d = −0.67, but had
no differential impact on task difficulty or competence,
ts ≤ −0.72, ps ≥ 0.48; see Table 1 for means and standard
deviations. Next, we used a moderated regression analysis
to explore the relationship between reactance, task difficulty,
and self-perceived competence moderated by condition.
While reactance had an overall negative impact on task
FIGURE 1 | Mediation model. All path coefficients represent unstandardized
regression weights. Because the two experiment groups are coded by a one
unit difference, the total effect of 3.23 can be interpreted as a mean difference.
Total adjusted R2 for the model = 0.11, F (2,50) = 3.18, p = 0.05. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.01.
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TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations for reactance, task difficulty and self-perceived competence in Study 1.
Reactance Task difficulty Self-perceived competence
Goal frame M SD M SD M SD
Approach goal frame 2.96 1.35 4.07 1.44 4.33 1.03
Avoidance goal frame 3.89 1.35 4.13 1.45 4.54 1.14
difficulty, β = 0.291, t(50) = 2.17, p = 0.035, it had no effect
on competence, β = 0.168, t(50) = 1.22, p = 0.227, and
no effect on either outcome variable when moderated by
condition2.
Finally, we tested whether task difficulty or competence
mediated effects on performance, finding a mediation only for
competence, R2 = 0.124, F(2,50) = 3.55 p = 0.036, showing that
more competence valuation yields a smaller number of mistakes
when searching for the correct letters (β= 0.296, p= 0.032)3.
Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, when a change was communicated
with an avoidance goal frame as compared to an approach
goal frame, participants in Study 1 showed impaired task
performance. They also indicated to experience more threat to
freedom, i.e., psychological reactance, when avoidance compared
to approach was the goal frame. Importantly, reactance mediated
the effect of goal frame on the outcome: Avoidance (vs. approach)
goal frame increased perceived threat to freedom, which in
turn impaired task performance. This finding supports our
theoretical claim that individuals who focus on a negatively
phrased restriction or undesired option, here a prohibition to
do something, face a greater aversive motivational state than
individuals who focus on a positively phrased restriction or
desired option, here an order to do something, even when the
content of the task itself remains almost identical. This is also
in line with previous research on approach and avoidance goal
frames in the achievement literature which documents that
individuals are more disorganized and challenged when they
set avoidance framed performance goals (Elliot and McGregor,
1999). Only those participants in the avoidance (compared with
the approach condition) who scored high in the perceived
difficulty of the task showed a negative relationship between
reactance and perceived competence. This finding resonates with
empirical evidence on the effects of threat versus challenge in
a task situation, in which a more difficult task (task difficulty
perceived to be high) was more likely to produces a threat (Förster
2Running correlations for each goal framing condition separately, however, the
approach condition did not reveal a significant association between reactance and
task difficulty in the approach condition (p ≥ 0.25) supporting the moderated
regression analysis. However, in the avoidance condition, reactance is positively
correlated with task-difficulty (r = 0.46, p = 0.023) suggesting that when more
threat was underway – as induced by the avoidance framing of the change request-,
more experience of threat to freedom was associated with a greater sense of
challenge.
3When including task difficulty as mediating variable the overall model did not
reach significance, R2 = 0.06, F(2,50) = 1.58, p = 0.217, indicating that the effect
of goal frames on performance cannot be explained with a greater perceived task
difficulty in the avoidance (M = 4.13, SD = 1.45) as compared with the approach
condition (M = 4.07, SD= 1.44), t(51)=−0.141, p= 889.
et al., 1998). For the purpose of our task, feedback was not
mentioned and not given, so in neither of the conditions appraisal
of own competence were possible.
Having obtained initial evidence that a perception of threat
to freedom is associated with more negative outcomes in task
performance when a change request is framed with an avoidance
goal, we intended to more directly test the role of freedom
restriction, introducing a condition that does not imply a
restriction in Study 2. Here we examined the impact of goal
frame in interaction with the presence versus absence of an
actual restriction to freedom. Furthermore, we intended to see
whether the effect of goal frame would replicate in a situation
of persuasive influence, looking at communicator variables and
persuasion in Study 2. Finally, we explored the effect of goal frame
and restriction on affect.
STUDY 2
The cognitive response approach (Petty et al., 1981) assumes
that the impact of a message on attitudes is mediated by
cognition. In hearing or reading a persuasive message, individuals
generate cognitions that can be in agreement or disagreement
with the message. Dillard and Shen (2005) contend that it
is plausible that individuals respond to freedom-threatening
messages with unfavorable cognitions about the message and
about the communicator.
Accordingly, we expect to find that individuals confronted
with a potential change presented with an avoidance compared
to an approach frame will experience the avoidance frame as
more threatening to their freedom which in turn will lead to a
lower agreement with and more counterarguing regarding the
proposed change. We further expect to find that individuals
in the avoidance compared with the approach frame condition
will evaluate the communicator of a threatening message more
negatively. This negative evaluation will be shown on dimensions
such as the perceived trustworthiness and competence of the
communicator. We further expect to find that those individuals
who are confronted with a restriction framed with an avoidance
goal will experience the strongest reactance and that reactance
will act as a mediator between the goal frame and the outcome,
here the agreement with the proposed change. In Study 2, we also
assessed differences in experienced emotions.
Method
Our heuristic approach was to match participant numbers of
previous studies on persuasive threat attempts and resistance
to attitude change, which obtained medium to large effect sizes
(e.g., Miller et al., 2007). With the goal of 100 participants, we
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began collecting data from a college student sample at a German
university during the summer semester and terminated data
collection when the academic year ended leaving a final N = 105.
Participants and Design
One hundred and five (79 women) participants volunteered
toward the end of an undergraduate lecture to evaluate what was
presented as the integration of a new program in return for course
credit. The mean age of participants was 20.90 years (range= 19–
43). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a
two (restriction: yes vs. no) by two (goal frame: approach vs.
avoidance) factorial design.
Procedure
First, the participants read a cover story in which a professor
described and advertised a new concentration named ‘Urban
Design’ as allegedly being implemented to the psychology
program in the near future. They were informed that as a
consequence of this addition a total of 13 instead of (now)
12 concentrations would be part of the program. The text
varied between four scenarios, namely whether the addition
would entail restrictions in terms of limited access to existing
seminars (restriction present) versus no limitations (restriction
absent) for the students and whether the addition of the
new concentration was framed in terms of an approach or
avoidance goal. In the approach goal frame conditions the
change was described as helping to improve the university’s
high ranking whereas in the avoidance goal frame condition
the change was described as helping to avoid a decrease in the
ranking.
After reading the text participants responded to questions
regarding their perception of the message (message evaluation:
agreement with change), communicator (communicator
evaluation: trustworthiness, competence), cognitive response:
counterarguing, their perceived threat to freedom (reactance)
and their affective (positive, negative) state. Next, participants
were given a final questionnaire assessing their basic
demographics. Finally, participants were debriefed about




To assess participants’ agreement with integration of new
concentration we used a five-item measure by Miller et al. (2007),
e.g.: “How much would you support the implementation of such a
program.” (α= 0.89).
Communicator evaluation
To assess participants’ perception of the communicator’s
competence we used a three-item measure of perceived
competence of the communicator (Dillard and Shen, 2005), e.g.:
“How qualified does the person who communicated the topic
appear to you.” (α = 0.91). To assess perceived trustworthiness,
we used a two-item measure used in previous research on the
impact of reactance on person perception (Silvia, 2006), e.g.:
“How trustworthy does the person who communicates the topic
appear to you?” (Spearman–Brown ρ= 0.88).
Cognitive response
To assess counterarguing we used a three-item measure
adapted from Rains and Turner (2007), e.g., “Did you develop
counterarguments against the here presented position? (α= 0.91).
Reactance
Threat to freedom in the form of psychological reactance was
assessed exactly as in Study 1, and scores were averaged to form a
composite index (α= 0.81).
PANAS-X
A self-report affect scale (PANAS-X; Watson et al., 1988) was
used to assess the affective consequences of the goal framing and
restriction conditions. This scale consists of 20 words and phrases
that describe different positive, negative and neutral feelings and
emotions. The participants had to indicate to what extent “they
felt this way right now.” Scores were averaged to form a composite
index for positive (six items; α = 0.84) and negative (nine items)
mood (α= 0.78).
All items were presented with a 10-point scale reaching from
1 (not at all) to 10 (absolutely).
Results
We ran a 2 (goal frame: approach versus avoidance) × 2
(restriction: present versus absent) between-subjects multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the composite scores of all
dependent variables.
Reactance
There was a main effect of goal frame, F(1,97) = 9.30,
p = 0.003, η2 = 0.09, 1 − β = 0.85 with participants reporting
greater experience of reactance in the avoidance (M = 3.63,
SD = 2.29), relative to the approach condition (M = 2.73,
SD= 1.48). This finding confirms our assumption that regardless
of any other consideration, individuals would be more reactant
when the addition to the program was presented in terms of
negative possibilities. In addition, we found a main effect of
restriction, confirming that the presence of a real restriction to
the participants program in their concentration elicited a greater
response in perceived threat when a restriction was present
(M = 4.17, SD = 2.12) than when it was not (M = 2.20,
SD = 0.95), F(1,97) = 44.39, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.31, 1 − β = 1.00.
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction,
F(1,97) = 5.72, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.06, 1 − β = 0.66. Means and
standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
Post hoc Comparisons for the Experience of
Reactance
Next, we conducted Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons
and found that within the approach goal frame conditions,
participants showed more reactance in the restriction as
compared with the no restriction condition, p = 0.013,
d = 0.92. Similarly, within the avoidance goal frame conditions,
participants showed more reactance in the restriction as
compared with the no restriction condition, p < 0.001, d = 1.26.
Looked at from a different angle, participants in the freedom
restriction conditions showed the most reactance when they
were in the avoidance as compared with the approach condition,
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TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations for reactance, agreement, trust, competence, counterarguing, positive affect, and negative affect in Study 2.
Reactance Agreement Trust Competence Counter-arguing Positive Affect Negative Affect
Goal frame Restriction M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Approach Present 3.66 2.05 6.67 2.35 6.11 1.68 6.89 1.63 5.28 2.10 2.27 0.63 1.34 0.40
Absent 2.11 0.98 7.04 1.68 6.93 1.82 7.13 1.65 4.40 2.37 2.41 0.69 1.35 0.41
Avoidance Present 5.07 2.28 5.46 1.78 5.16 2.06 5.62 1.86 5.95 2.60 2.14 0.67 1.56 0.46
Absent 2.59 1.66 5.90 1.93 5.68 2.07 6.11 1.79 5.36 3.07 2.34 0.69 1.54 0.60
p = 0.005, d = 0.69. There was no significant difference
between approach and avoidance in the no restriction condition,
p= 0.553, d = 0.33.
Message Evaluation, Communicator Evaluation,
Cognitive Response, PANAS-X
We found a significant main effect for goal frame on all
other dependent variables with the exception of counter-arguing
(p > 0.1, η2 = 0.026; more counter-arguing for avoidance
frame) and positive mood (p > 0.4, η2 = 0.007). There was less
agreement with the proposed change (Mavoi = 5.80, SD = 1.75;
Mappr = 6.97, SD = 1.74), F(1,97) = 10.52, p = 0.002,
η2 = 0.10, 1 − β = 0.89, less perception of communicator
competence (Mavoi = 5.96, SD= 1.75; Mappr = 6.91, SD = 1.63),
F(1,97) = 8.03, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.08, 1 − β = 0.80, and less
trust (Mavoi = 5.53, SD = 1.96; Mappr = 6.59, SD = 1.75),
F(1,97) = 8.18, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.08, 1 − β = 0.81, when
it was presented with an avoidance frame as compared to an
approach frame. Furthermore they experienced more negative
mood (Mavoi = 1.53; SD = 0.52, Mappr = 1.34; SD = 0.41) in the
avoidance frame condition, F(1,97)= 4.61, p= 0.034, η2 = 0.05,
1− β= 0.57.
As for restriction, we also found a marginally significant
main effect on trust, indicating that people perceived the
communicator as less trustworthy when she emphasized the
restrictions for the program related to the change (M = 5.73;
SD= 1.90) compared with the absence of a restriction (M = 6.45;
SD = 1.90), F(1,97) = 3.79, p = 0.054, η2 = 0.04, 1 − β = 0.49;
see Table 2 for all means and standard deviations.
Mediational Role of Reactance
Since the interaction effect of restriction and goal frame suggests
that the framing affected reactance only when a restriction
was present, we tested the meditational role of reactance here
including restriction as a moderator, looking at the behaviorally
most relevant outcome variable: agreement. To examine whether
the agreement with the proposed change was mediated by
the experience of threat to freedom in the form of reactance
in dependence of the restriction condition, we conducted a
moderated mediation analysis using the PROCESS tool by
Hayes (2012). Examining the relationship between the goal
frame condition and our central outcome variable ‘agreement,’
bootstrapping techniques employed to test conditional indirect
effects confirmed the mediating role of reactance in Study 2
only when an actual restriction was present. The indirect effect
of reactance on agreement was significant and positive (0.71)
with a 95% confidence interval excluding zero (0.1653 to 1.3147),
indicating significant mediation only when a restriction was
present: The avoidance frame was associated with more reactance
which in turn led to less agreement with the proposed change
(see Figure 2). However, the interaction term qualifying this
mediation did not reach significance (p= 0.127)4.
Inter-correlations of Dependent Variables
Previously, the above six theoretically derived variables have
been found to predict decision making following persuasion
attempt. To explore these relationships further, correlational
analyses were carried out. The majority of the variables correlated
significantly with agreement. Most importantly, agreement is
negatively associated with reactance r = −0.52, p < 0.001,
while reactance is negatively correlated with both perceived
4Finding the goal frame affecting agreement via reactance only when a restriction
was present on the one hand, and the main effect for goal frame on agreement
on the other hand, suggest that framing has the same effect on agreement in the
presence or absence of a restriction, however, for different reasons. One candidate
mechanism to mediate the effect of goal frame on agreement in the absence of
a restriction could be trust, since it represents the only other variable besides
reactance to be affected by both factors (goal frame and restriction). In order to
explore the meditational role of trust on reactance, we conducted a moderated
mediation analysis with restriction as a moderator. Examining the relationship
between the goal frame condition and agreement, bootstrapping techniques
employed to test conditional indirect effects also here suggest a mediating role
of trust in Study 2 only when there was no actual restriction. The indirect
effect of trust on agreement was significant and negative (−0.66) with a 95%
confidence interval excluding zero (−1.1653 to 0.1359), indicating mediation when
a restriction was absent: The avoidance frame was associated with less trust which
in turn led more reactance. However, this conditional effect was only slightly
greater than the non-significant indirect effect of trust on reactance when there was
a restriction (−0.50; confidence interval including zero −1.3681 to 0.0529), which
is reflected in the fact that here the interaction term qualifying this mediation did
not become significant (p > 0.6).
FIGURE 2 | Moderated mediation model. All path coefficients are
unstandardized regression weights. Total adjusted R2 for the model = 28,
F (2,102) = 13.48, p < 0.001. #p = 0.37, n.s.; ##p = 0.13, n.s.; ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.001.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 632
fpsyg-07-00632 May 13, 2016 Time: 15:0 # 9
Niesta Kayser et al. Avoidance Goal Frames and Reactance
competence, r = −0.47, p < 0.001, and trustworthiness of
communicator r = −0.53, p < 0.001, and is positively correlated
with counterarguing, r = 0.60, p < 0.001 and negative mood
r = 0.25, p = 0.009. So, the more reactant the person felt the
less competent s/he evaluated the communicator. Additionally,
the other aspect of how the communicator was perceived
(trustworthiness of communicator) and the cognitive response
(counterarguing) correlate substantially with both reactance and
agreement with proposed change. As predicted, the greater
the reactance, the less trustworthy the communicator appears
and the more counter-arguing takes place. Conversely, the less
trustworthy the participant evaluated the communicator and the
more counterarguments s/he elaborated pertaining to the change
the lower was her agreement with the message (see Table 3 for all
correlations).
Discussion
In Study 2, we replicated the finding that goal frame influences
how people respond to a proposed change through the experience
of freedom restriction. While a freedom restriction was implied
in the change request in Study 1, here we varied the explicit
presence or absence of a restriction in a communication that
was approach or avoidance framed. Consistent with reactance
theory participants’ felt threatened in their freedom when the
communication indicated a restriction to their current range of
choice for seminars. The restriction, however, led to even more
reactance when it was presented in terms of an avoidance frame
as compared to an approach frame. So, the presence of an actual
restriction played an important role, however, when a restriction
was present, the goal frame still significantly affected the degree
of reactance. Goal frame, but not restriction, also influenced the
evaluation of the communicator such that an avoidance frame
led to less positive perceptions of the communicator and worse
evaluations of the message. Moreover, the message presented with
an avoidance frame as compared with an approach frame led
to more counterarguing and less agreement with the proposed
change. Looking at the meditational role of reactance here, we
find that reactance mediates the impact of the goal frame on
agreement with the communicated change only when an explicit
freedom restriction was present. When there was no restriction
the impact of goal frame was instead mediated, in part, via
trust in the communicator, as our explorative mediation analyses
suggested (see footnote 4). This suggests, that even messages that
do not necessarily restrict the audience may yield disagreement
elicited by reduced trust in the communicator when an avoidance
goal is the frame.
Specifically, the above findings replicate and extend those
reported in a meta-analysis conducted by Rains (2013), where
counter-arguing and negative affective responses played a strong
direct role in explaining the emergence of reactance. The present
study extends these findings by relating the experience of a threat
to freedom to goal framing.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experiments, when restricting a person’s freedom
avoidance goal frames were associated with more resistance to
change on different levels of experience (reactance, performance,
communication) and across different domains (achievement,
person perception) than approach goal frames. Consistent with
reactance theory, participants showed an especially aversive
motivational state when a change was phrased in terms of a
prohibition. The particular association between psychological
reactance and goal frame in explaining the reception of a
proposed change suggests that in some circumstances change can
be experienced as more of a threat to freedom and therefore as a
greater self-threat, particularly when it is frame as an avoidance
goal.
Understanding change as a potential threat to self, contingent
on the motivational and the situational context, emphasizes the
complexity of the psychological processes that are involved. The
appraisal of change is not limited to cognitive restructuring
and integrating of new information or behavioral scripts. It
can also be experienced as a self-relevant message that requires
accommodation not only on the behavioral level, but that impacts
an individual’s sense of self-determination. As such, the goal-
framing of change has implications for theory and practice.
Theoretical Implications
Extending reactance theory, the present research differentiated
the induction of reactance. Across two experiments we
differentiated between two outcomes of social pressure: We
induced threat to freedom by requesting a person to change
strategy (“you must,” Study 1) or by suggesting that a change
would lead to a restriction in choice options (“limited access
to seminars,” Study 2), while varying the goal frame, with the
TABLE 3 | Study 2: Inter-correlations for reactance, agreement, counterarguing, trust, competence, positive affect, and negative affect.
Composite scores 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Reactance – −0.523∗∗ 0.597∗∗ −0.471∗∗ −0.528∗∗ −0.154 0.253∗
2. Agreement _ −0.415∗∗ 0.587∗∗ 0.601∗∗ 0.180 −0.177
3. Counterarguing _ −0.502∗∗ −0.576∗∗ −0.046 0.119
4. Perceived competence _ 0.895∗∗ 0.246∗ −0.235∗
5. Trust _ 0.146 −0.310∗∗
6. Positive affect _ −0.009
7. Negative affect _
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
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assumption that avoidance frames imply freedom restriction
and may thus increase reactance. Drawing on one part of the
underlying axioms of reactance theory, namely, on the effect of
impositions and prohibitions (see Wicklund, 1974), leads to the
assumption that both the change requests and the restriction of
choice may be perceived as threats to freedom and should hence,
induce similar amounts of reactance.
The present findings, however, show that a restriction, when
presented with an avoidance goal frame is perceived to be
more threatening. To our knowledge, no other study has yet
examined these specific message features in their implication
for important every day decisions on how to phrase a request
for change. In communicating change that implies a freedom
restriction, emphasis on whether the change is associated with
an additional positive outcome or whether a negative outcome
can be avoided has a direct effect on the extent to which it
is perceived as a restriction to personal freedom: Additional
positive outcomes suggest a choice for the individual to decide,
if these are wanted, or if the status quo is satisfying enough.
Potential negative outcomes put the status quo at risk, which
suggests more need to change an existing course of action. Our
findings suggest that it is partly the implied restriction of freedom
conveyed through goal framing that can make an actual freedom
restriction to be responded to more or less in terms of a threat
to self – here: expressed reactance and the associated variables
(impaired performance, negative evaluation of a communicator,
disagreement with message).
This interpretation of our findings resonates well with two
prominent theoretical accounts. First, it draws on research that
demonstrates on how the framing of a goal corresponds to
the way in which the goal is represented in memory (Elliot
and Friedman, 2007). The negative and undesirable dimension
appears to be more salient in memory. Cognitive representations
or schemas, when made salient or primed, are more easily
retrieved and the likelihood that the forbidden option is selected
or undesirable behavior is shown increases. Research in education
and health (e.g., Granpre et al., 2003), focus on the question on
when children and young adults react most favorably to anti-
smoking, anti-drinking or anti-drug campaigns. These findings
are supportive of the idea that it is a more adaptive strategy
for teachers and health counselors to offer and name a desirable
outcome than to focus on the undesirable outcome. Also, research
conducted in the context of drug abuse prevention, points at the
potential controlling nature of warnings and prohibitions (see,
self-determination theory, Ryan and Deci, 2000) and contends
that warning of negative outcomes may increase perceived threat
to self and thus impair self-regulation. Therefore, instead of
communicating prohibitions that are perceived to be controlling,
phrasing a request in a manner that enables the individual to
seek a solution in a more autonomous way allows for an easier
integration of the change into a self-relevant course of action.
Second, it taps into the work by Higgins (1998) on
the regulatory focus, which contends that not only chronic
states, but also momentary situations – such as induced by
message framing – can temporarily yield either a promotion
or a prevention focus. For example, feedback messages or
task instructions can communicate gain/non-gain information
(promotion focus) or non-loss/loss information (prevention
focus). Despite the seemingly close affinity between the concepts
of approach-avoidance goal frames and self-regulatory focus,
these two concepts are theoretically different. The approach-
avoidance distinction is rooted in the hedonic principle that
contends that individuals strive to attain pleasurable and to
stay away from painful outcomes. Self-regulatory focus theory
distinguishes between two kinds of goal attainment that vary in
chronic focus: attainment of aspirations and accomplishments
(promotion focus) and attainment of responsibilities and safety
(prevention focus). In combining both theoretical concepts, the
approach-avoidance distinction could be viewed as a unifying
conceptual thread used to organize and integrate various levels
of investigation as it is applicable to dispositional, domain-
specific, and situation-specific levels of analysis. For example,
work by Higgins (1998) tested whether participants’ motivation
for approach versus avoidance was influenced by their regulatory
focus and found that participants primed with promotion focus
ideals recalled situations better in which they had to approach a
match to a goal. The reverse applied to participants primed with
a prevention focus.
Across both studies, the present findings show that the
type of goal frame directly influences the outcome: When a
change message was framed in terms of positive outcomes it
led to less reactance, which in turn, yielded a lower (self-
perceived) task difficulty, performance or person perception.
The explaining role of reactance when a restriction to freedom
was implied is consistent with recent findings by Reinhart
et al. (2007), who found that gain-framed messages produce
more positive reactions toward organ and tissue donation, and
lower psychological reactance than loss-framed messages. In this
research, following freedom restriction, psychological reactance,
and perceived manipulative intent were found to mediate the
relationship between framing and message reactions.
Practical Implications and Future
Directions
Research has supported the idea that resistance in the context
of organizational change is often attributed to the situation
specific to a change (e.g., Burke, 2008). Resistance to change
comes from experiencing a lack of choice (i.e., the imposition
of change) or from being forced to move away from a known
state of being and acting (i.e., the deprivation of stability).
The attenuation of aversive affect is critical to the success of
a change request. It is important to factor in how changes
and change requests are communicated. Understanding the
importance of how to communicate change, so that people
can engage with it constructively is of high relevance in the
context of health communication, organizational change, social
and economic justice movements, as well as in educational
settings. When people see change as an opportunity to improve
the status quo rather than a necessity to maintain it, they feel
less threatened in their self-determined action and are more
likely to integrate the proposed change, as opposed to showing
resistance against change to protect an ego-motive. In this context
it could be of interest to – in addition to reactance – explore
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autonomy, which has shown differential relationships with
reactance on how influence is interpreted depending on the
source of communication (Pavey and Sparks, 2009)– the frame
of the message might add to understanding of the complexity of
persuasive communication.
Apparently, the pursuit of some types of goals is more
depleting than others. One underexplored issue concerns the
process that mediates the link between avoidance framed goal
pursuit and goal progress. The presented studies show that
avoidance goal frames possess a number of features that are
detrimental in the process of regulation (see also Elliot and
Sheldon, 1997). Future research may need to further address the
question whether and why an avoidance framed goal is perceived
to be more threatening to self and why prohibitions more than
orders seem to elicit more negative affect. Mediational work on
avoidance goal frames remains relatively sparse (see Elliot and
Thrash, 2002): several processes appear to account for avoidance
goal frames effects such as worry, stress generation, and poor goal
progress. Reactance promises to be a new and intriguing mediator
to study more in detail.
Furthermore, recent work seems to support our findings
in that they point at the threatening nature of avoidance
goal frames: avoidance as compared with approach goal
frames deplete self-regulatory resources (Oertig et al., 2013).
In the context of this research, importantly, the degree of
threat was measured directly and compared between the two
different goal frame conditions, a measure that the recent
work has failed to assess. Therefore, it is only speculative if
avoidance versus approach goal frames are experienced as more
threatening in our research herein, but it is reasonable to
argue so. Additionally, the cumulative findings of two studies
appear to be consistent on the notion of the avoidance–
reactance–compliance with change link and yield first empirical
evidence that the focus on a negative outcome can lead
to a more pronounced perceived threat of the self-motive
freedom. This threatened self-motive then negatively affects the
compliance with the change. Reduced levels of persistence in the
avoidance as compared with the approach condition may be an
alternative account, which would be worth investigating in future
research.
Finally, future research may investigate the process behind
the link between avoidance and the emergence of reactance. It is
possible that a request to change is perceived to be less legitimate
when negative instead of positive outcomes are emphasized
(Elliot and Friedman, 2007).
To further enhance the generalizability of our findings, future
research may need to implement more distinct state-and trait
measures and different time frames. Previous work has discussed
state and trait levels of avoidance goal frames (Fryer and Elliot,
2007) and state and trait levels of reactance (Dowd et al., 1991;
Shoham et al., 2004).
In sum, given the negative implications of avoidance goal
pursuit, a practical approach in social interactions would rely
on a message framing that shifts the individual toward the
pursuit of approach framed goals. Communicators might be well-
advised to avoid high threat messages. Resistance in the context
of organizational change is often attributed to the situation
specific to the change at hand. Each request to change holds an
implicit threat and may thwart the person’s motive of need for
control. The thwarted need, in turn, may lead to more resistance
to follow the request (Rothbaum et al., 1982). One method to
provide control for those whose need was thwarted may consist
in attempting to predict events in order to avoid disappointment
even if it means a worse outcome compared to the status quo.
According to Shelly Taylor’s prominent work on adjustment to
threatening events, a person’s thwarted need of control following
a change request may be restored in providing meaning in the
(loss) experience and providing an opportunity to regain mastery
over the event and the possibility to enhance one’s self-esteem
(Taylor, 1983).
CONCLUSION
The present research shows that communication style in terms
of goal frame influences how a request to change is perceived via
the experience of threat to freedom. It therefore allows theoretical
insights into the process underlying the impairing effect of
avoidance goal frames and helps to further our understanding
on when and why a request leads to compliance. Understanding
more specifically how the frame of a communicated change
can affect self-related notions of freedom should ideally help to
circumvent blind resistance in communication while allowing to
focus on the actual implications of the change.
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